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Art	  and	  Perspicuous	  Vision	  	  
in	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophical	  Reflection	  	  
Giuseppe	  Di	  Giacomo	  
1.	  From	  the	  Tractatus	  to	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations:	  From	  Logic	  to	  Aesthetics	  
	  
If	   today	   a	   decidedly	   analytical	   interpretation	   of	   Wittgenstein’s	   thought	   seems	   to	   be	  
dominant	  in	  many	  ways,	  there	  are,	  in	  my	  opinion,	  countless	  reasons	  that	  lead	  instead	  to	  
reintroduce	   the	  possibility,	   and	  even	   the	  opportunity,	   of	   a	   different	   reading:	   a	   proper	  
philosophical-­‐aesthetic	  reading	  –	  where	  «philosophical»	   is	  equivalent	  to	  «transcenden-­‐
tal»	  in	  the	  Kantian	  sense	  –	  which	  certainly	  seems	  to	  me	  more	  productive	  in	  theoretical	  
terms,	   as	   I	   have	   already	   tried	   to	   demonstrate	   in	  my	   book	  Dalla	   logica	   all’estetica.	  Un	  
saggio	  intorno	  a	  Wittgenstein	  (Di	  Giacomo	  [1989]).	  
In	  my	  volume,	  and	  later	   in	  subsequent	  essays,	   I	   investigated	  especially	  the	  meaning	  
of	  Wittgenstein’s	  «shift»	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   the	  Tractatus	   to	   the	  approach	  of	   the	  
Philosophical	  Investigations,	  reading	  it	  in	  the	  first	  place	  as	  a	  transition	  from	  unity	  to	  mul-­‐
tiplicity,	  or,	  which	  is	  the	  same,	  from	  being	  to	  becoming,	  hence	  from	  necessity	  to	  contin-­‐
gency.	  Indeed,	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  Wittgenstein	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  assigns	  to	  philosophy	  –	  as	  is	  
known	   –	   the	   task	   to	   define	   the	   essence	   of	   language,	   it	   is	   also	   true	   that,	   in	   this	   same	  
work,	  such	  essence	  is	  to	  be	  found	  in	  logic	  as	  universal	  and	  necessary	  order,	  that	  is	  able	  
to	  guarantee	  a	  priori	  the	  functioning	  of	  the	  only	  language	  endowed	  with	  a	  sense,	  which	  
is,	  in	  this	  perspective,	  «denotative»	  language,	  i.e.	  language	  based	  on	  the	  distinction	  be-­‐
tween	  true	  and	  false.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  according	  to	  the	  referentialist	  conception	  
expressed	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  word	  is	  the	  object	  such	  a	  word	  stands	  for	  –	  
the	  referent,	  precisely,	  to	  which	  it	  refers	  –,	  which	  is	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  identity	  of	  struc-­‐
ture	  (i.e.	  of	  the	  «logical	  form»)	  existing	  between	  language	  and	  reality.	  
Well,	   it	   is	   precisely	   the	   alleged	   fundamentality	   of	   such	   a	   referentialist	   model	   that	  
Wittgenstein	   radically	  questions	   in	  his	  Philosophical	   Investigations:	  here	   is,	   in	   fact,	   the	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notion	  that	  everyday	  language,	  i.e.	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  its	  possible	  different	  actual	  uses,	  is	  
more	  originary	  and	  fundamental	  than	  the	  denotative	  paradigm.	  In	  this	  sense,	  what	  pre-­‐
cedes	  –	  in	  a	  «transcendental»	  sense	  –	  any	  possible	  rationale	  for	  language	  (and	  its	  mean-­‐
ingfulness)	   is	  our	  own	  ability	  to	  «act»,	   i.e.	  our	  ability	  to	  use	  ordinary	  language	  in	  many	  
different	   ways;	   it	   is	   no	   coincidence	   that,	   in	  On	   Certainty,	  Wittgenstein	   cites	   Goethe’s	  
statement	  that	  «in	  the	  beginning	  was	  the	  action».	  This	  is	  also	  what	  Wittgenstein	  points	  
out	  from	  the	  very	  first	  paragraph	  of	  the	  Philosophical	   Investigations,	  containing	  the	  fa-­‐
mous	  example	  of	  the	  «shopkeeper»	  and	  the	  «five	  red	  apples»,	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  second	  
paragraph,	  concerning	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  «builder»	  and	  his	  «assistant»:	  at	  a	  
closer	  look,	  what	  emerges	  is,	  in	  both	  cases,	  the	  insufficiency	  and	  non-­‐fundamentality	  of	  
the	  denotative	  model,	  whose	  functioning	  always	  presupposes	  a	  linguistic	  dimension	  that	  
can	  never	  be	  fully	  defined	  in	  logical-­‐intellectuals	  terms.	  	  
In	  this	  context,	  what	  Wittgenstein	  seems	  to	  «put	  on	  stage»	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Inves-­‐
tigations	  is	  a	  real	  dissolution	  of	  the	  uniform	  and	  compact	  unity	  exhibited	  in	  the	  Tracta-­‐
tus	   in	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  possible	  concrete	  situations	  represented	  by	  the	  so-­‐called	  «lan-­‐
guage-­‐games»,	  among	  which	  is	  undoubtedly	  the	  denotative	  model.	  It	  is	  clear,	  then,	  that	  
Wittgenstein	  in	  no	  way	  denies	  the	  validity	  of	  the	  latter,	  but	  rather	  –	  as	  I	  said	  –	  its	  sup-­‐
posed	  originality	  and	  fundamentality.	  This	  emerges	  especially	  from	  paragraph	  18,	  where	  
he	   highlights	   the	   «secondary»	   and	   «derivative»	   character	   of	   that	   logical	   dimension	   –	  
and,	   consequently,	   of	   those	  highly	   formalised	   scientific	   languages	   –	   in	  which	   the	  neo-­‐
positivist	   perspective	   expressed	   by	   the	  Vienna	  Circle	   claimed	   instead	   to	   recognise	   the	  
very	   foundation	   of	   sense;	   here,	   in	   fact,	   Wittgenstein	   states	   that	   «the	   symbolism	   of	  
chemistry	  and	  the	  notation	  of	  the	  infinitesimal	  calculus»	  are,	  upon	  closer	  inspection,	  the	  
«suburbs	  of	  our	  language»,	  and	  not	  its	  essential	  nucleus:	  
(And	  how	  many	  houses	  or	  streets	  does	  it	  take	  before	  a	  town	  begins	  to	  be	  a	  town?)	  Our	  lan-­‐
guage	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  an	  ancient	  city:	  a	  maze	  of	   little	   streets	  and	  squares,	  of	  old	  and	  new	  
houses,	   and	  of	   houses	  with	   extensions	   from	   various	   periods,	   and	   all	   this	   surrounded	  by	   a	  
multitude	  of	  new	  suburbs	  with	  straight	  and	  regular	  streets	  and	  uniform	  houses.	  (TLP:	  §	  18)	  	  
Furthermore,	   that	   logic	   cannot	   be	   the	   absolute	   and	   incontrovertible	   foundation	   of	  
language	   is	  demonstrated	   in	   the	   first	  place	  by	   the	   fact	   that,	   if	   every	   language-­‐game	   is	  
always	  in	  some	  way	  governed	  by	  «rules»	  (which	  as	  such	  have	  a	  logical	  basis),	  it	  is	  none-­‐
theless	  undeniable	  that	  not	  everything,	  in	  the	  concrete	  practice	  of	  that	  game,	  can	  be	  ex-­‐
plained	  through	  rules:	  what	  escapes	   logos,	   from	  this	  point	  of	  view,	   is	  the	  very	  applica-­‐
tion	   of	   the	   rule,	   i.e.	   the	   application	   of	   the	   concept	   in	   abstracto	   (the	   universal)	   to	   the	  
contingency	  of	   the	   single	   concrete	   case	   (the	  particular).	   Indeed,	   if	   such	  an	  application	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were	   itself	   governed	   by	   principles	   that	   could	   be	  made	   analytically	   explicit,	   the	   result	  
would	  be	  an	  unacceptable	  «infinite	  regress»,	  and	  this	  because	  each	  rule,	  introduced	  to	  
explain	  the	  application	  of	  a	  particular	  concept	  to	  a	  specific	  case,	  would	  in	  turn	  need,	  in	  
order	  to	  be	  applied,	  another	  rule,	  and	  so	  on,	  precisely	  ad	  infinitum.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  
«agreement»,	   and	   hence	   the	   actual	   «proportioning»,	   between	   the	   particular	   and	   the	  
universal	  is	  each	  time	  made	  possible	  by	  a	  principle	  that	  in	  fact	  exists	  beyond	  the	  logical	  
dimension:	  a	  truly	  aesthetic	  principle,	  and	  I	  mean	  by	  this	  –	  in	  the	  very	  Kantian	  sense	  of	  
the	  term	  –	  an	  authentic	  feeling	  (the	  ability,	  for	  example,	  to	  «feel»	  that	  a	  certain	  use	  of	  
language,	  within	  a	  specific	  language-­‐game,	  is	  the	  most	  «appropriate»)	  .	  
In	  this	  perspective,	   it	   is	  precisely	  to	  highlight	  the	  irreducibility	  of	  such	  feeling	  to	  the	  
realm	   of	   logos	   that	  Wittgenstein,	   in	   paragraph	   78	   of	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations,	  
compares	  the	  notions	  of	  «knowing»	  and	  «saying»,	  emphasizing	  how,	  if	  we	  can	  «say»	  for	  
example	   «how	   many	   metres	   high	   Mont	   Blanc	   is»,	   we	   cannot	   say	   «how	   a	   clarinet	  
sounds»;	  and	  yet	  we	  recognise,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  we	  «know»,	  how	  a	  clarinet	  sounds.	  Even	  at	  
this	   level,	  then,	  one	  can	  see	  that	  such	  a	  relationship	  between	  «knowing»	  and	  «saying»	  
can	  be	  considered	  a	  reformulation	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  «saying»	  and	  «showing»,	  
which	  was	  one	  of	  the	  central	  points	   in	  the	  Tractatus	  and	  which,	  as	  a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   in	  
later	  works	  does	  not	  take	  on	  the	  form	  of	  a	  contradiction,	  but	  rather	  of	  a	  mutual	  presup-­‐
position,	  because,	  in	  order	  to	  «say»,	  we	  have	  to	  know	  already,	  as	  testified	  in	  an	  exem-­‐
plary	   way	   –	   again	   in	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations	   –	   by	   the	   relationship	   between	  
«use»	  and	  «understanding»:	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  we	  understand	  a	  sign	  as	  we	  are	  able	  to	  use	  
it	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  multiple	  language-­‐games	  in	  which	  that	  same	  sign	  can	  occur,	  it	  is	  also	  
true	  that	  this	  possibility	  of	  multiple	  uses	  necessarily	  presupposes	  our	  understanding	  of	  
the	  unity	   implicit	   in	   that	  multiplicity	   of	   uses;	   and	   it	   is	   such	  understanding	   that	   consti-­‐
tutes	  the	  aesthetic	  principle	  which	  –	  as	  already	  mentioned	  –	  is	  a	  real	  feeling.	  
Thus,	   it	   is	  precisely	   in	  recognising	  the	  «more	  fundamental»	  character	  of	  this	   feeling	  
compared	  to	  any	  possible	  logical-­‐conceptual	  dimension,	  that	  the	  Philosophical	  Investiga-­‐
tions	  appear	  not	  as	  the	  denial	  of	  the	  point	  of	  view	  expressed	  in	  the	  Tractatus,	  but	  rather	  
as	  its	  development	  and	  its	  further	  investigation,	  in	  a	  «movement»	  in	  many	  ways	  similar	  
to	  Kant’s	   shift	   from	   the	  notion	  of	  «transcendental»	   formulated	   in	   the	  Critique	  of	  Pure	  
Reason	  to	  the	  one	  expounded	  in	  the	  Critique	  of	  the	  Power	  of	  Judgment.	  In	  this	  perspec-­‐
tive,	  if	  any	  possible	  primacy	  assigned	  to	  the	  logical	  dimension,	  and	  therefore	  to	  necessi-­‐
ty	  over	  contingency,	  is	  refused	  in	  the	  transition	  from	  the	  Tractatus	  to	  the	  Philosophical	  
Investigations	  –	  and	  this	   is	  exactly	  the	  destruction,	  consciously	  carried	  out	  by	  Wittgen-­‐
stein,	  of	  all	   those	   traditional	  metaphysical	   structures	   that	  he	  calls	  «houses	  of	  cards»	  –	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however,	   such	  a	  «shift»	  must	  not	   in	  any	  way	  be	  understood	  as	  a	   rejection	  of	   the	   first	  
term	  exclusively	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  second;	  in	  other	  words,	  there	  is	  no	  relativism:	  no	  side-­‐
lining	  of	  the	  «condition»	  in	  the	  name	  of	  a	  (neopragmatist)	  absolutization	  of	  the	  «condi-­‐
tioned».	  Rather,	  what	  prevails	  is	  the	  need	  to	  encompass	  the	  relationship	  –	  indeed	  para-­‐
doxical	   –	   existing	   between	   the	   two	   polarities,	   with	   the	   awareness	   that	   an	   «identity-­‐
difference»	  is	  really	  at	  stake.	  
Here	  the	  point	  is	  that	  if	  essence	  as	  unchanging	  foundation	  of	  reality	  is	  undoubtedly	  –	  
as	  Wittgenstein	  writes	   in	  paragraph	  340	  of	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	  –	  a	  «preju-­‐
dice»,	  it	  is	  not,	  however,	  a	  «stupid	  prejudice».	  Hence,	  then,	  the	  crucial	  importance	  of	  a	  
paragraph	  such	  as	  65,	  dealing	  with	  the	  very	  question	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  unity	  
and	  multiplicity;	   it	   is	  no	  coincidence	   that	  Wittgenstein	   states	   in	   the	  paragraph	   that	  he	  
does	  not	  want	  to	  «let	  himself	  off»	  the	  quest	  for	  unity	  he	  had	  been	  pursuing	  in	  the	  Trac-­‐
tatus,	  which	  now	  appears	  as	  the	  capability	  to	  understand	  the	  affinities	  –	  i.e.	  the	  «family	  
resemblances»	  –	  among	  different	   language-­‐games.	  This	  capability,	  moreover,	   is	  closely	  
linked	  to	  the	  notion	  of	  «perspicuous	  vision»	  referred	  to	  in	  paragraph	  122	  –	  a	  notion	  that	  
in	  fact	  coincides	  with	  the	  notions	  of	  «grasping	  at	  a	  stroke»	  and	  «seeing-­‐as»	  –	  and	  that	  
consists	   in	  the	  ability	  to	  «understand»,	  that	  is,	  to	  grasp	  unity	   in	  diversity.	   In	  this	  sense,	  
we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  unity	  –	  the	  one	  implicit	  in	  the	  many	  family	  resemblances	  gradually	  
identified	  among	  the	  various	  phenomena	  one	  observes	  –	  which	  presents	  itself	  not	  as	  an	  
analytical	  unity	  (which,	  as	  such,	  can	  be	  translated	  in	  conceptual	  terms),	  but	  as	  a	  synthet-­‐
ic	  one	  (which,	  as	  such,	  can	  never	  be	  made	  fully	  explicit):	  it	  is,	  indeed,	  a	  unity	  which,	  in	  its	  
always	  new	  and	  different	  configurations,	  cannot	  be	  «said»	  but	  only	  «felt»,	  in	  the	  sense	  
that	   it	   cannot	  be	  «known»,	  but	  only	  «thought»	  or	  «imagined».	  We	  are	  dealing,	   there-­‐
fore,	  with	  a	  constitutively	   temporal	  unity:	  with	  a	  dimension	   that	  «becomes»	  and	   that,	  
while	   exceeding	   each	   of	   its	   possible	   manifestations,	   can	   never	   be	   «grasped»	   inde-­‐
pendently	  of	   it.	   Therefore,	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	   attest	   to	   the	  emergence	  of	  
an	  insurmountable	  and,	  as	  such,	  foundational	  paradox:	  the	  one	  expressed	  by	  the	  mutual	  
presupposition	  of	  concrete	  «use»	  and	  abstract	  «rule»,	  that	  is	  to	  say	  «use»	  and	  «under-­‐
standing»,	   and	   hence	   by	   the	  mutual	   implication	   of	   «condition»	   (universal,	   necessary)	  
and	  «conditioned»	  (particular,	  contingent).	  
Hence,	  then,	  the	  radical	  redefinition	  of	  the	  role	  assigned	  to	  philosophy,	  as	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	  clearly	  highlights	   from	  paragraphs	  89	  and	  90	  onwards:	   if	   logic,	   in	   fact,	   seeking	  to	  
«see	  to	  the	  foundation	  of	  things»,	  i.e.	  intending	  to	  investigate	  «the	  essence»,	  «shouldn’t	  
concern	  itself	  whether	  things	  actually	  happen	  in	  this	  or	  that	  way»,	  and	  if	  science	  instead	  
arises	  from	  an	  «interest	   in	  the	  facts	  of	  nature»,	  that	   is	   from	  the	  «need	  to	  grasp	  causal	  
Giuseppe	  Di	  Giacomo,	  Art	  and	  Perspicuous	  Vision	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  Philosophical	  Reflection	  
pag.	  155	  
©	  Firenze	  University	  Press	  •	  Aisthesis	  •	  1/2013	  •	  www.fupress.com/aisthesis	  •	  ISSN	  2035-­‐8466	  
connections»	   in	   an	   attempt	   to	   explain	   phenomena,	   philosophy,	   on	   the	   contrary,	   not	  
wanting	   to	   «learn	   anything	   new»,	   that	   is,	   without	   claiming	   to	   know	   the	   phenomena,	  
wants	   to	   «understand»	   –	   and	   not	   «explain»,	   as	   science	   does	   –	   «something	   that	   is	   al-­‐
ready	  in	  plain	  view».	  From	  Wittgenstein’s	  viewpoint,	  such	  an	  understanding	  of	  philoso-­‐
phy	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  «see	  right	  into	  phenomena»,	  where	  to	  «see	  right	  into»	  means	  in	  the	  
first	  place	  to	  grasp,	  from	  within	  a	  particular	  language-­‐game,	  the	  similarities	  and	  the	  dif-­‐
ferences	   between	   the	   present	   and	   other	   language-­‐games;	   but	   it	   also	   means,	   for	   this	  
very	  reason,	  to	  critically	  interrogate	  the	  data,	  that	  is	  the	  multiple,	  to	  go	  back	  to	  its	  inter-­‐
nal	  conditions	  of	  possibility,	  or	  to	  its	  «horizon	  of	  meaning»	  (the	  synthetic	  unity,	  precise-­‐
ly)	  never	  fully	  determined	  and	  never	  fully	  defined.	  
2.	  The	  Importance	  of	  the	  Notion	  of	  «Mystical»	  and	  the	  Question	  of	  the	  Saying-­‐Showing	  
Relationship	  
More	  generally	  it	  is	  crucial,	  in	  order	  to	  highlight	  the	  importance	  of	  ethics	  and	  aesthetics	  
in	   the	  Tractatus,	   to	   consider	   the	  notion	  of	   «mystical»,	  which	  means	   «what	   cannot	   be	  
expressed»	  or	  «what	  is	  unsayable»;	  it	   is	  no	  coincidence	  that,	   identifying	  unsayable	  and	  
mystical,	  Wittgenstein	  intends	  to	  refer	  to	  «feeling»,	  i.e.	  to	  «something	  felt»,	  which	  can-­‐
not	   be	   expressed	   through	  words,	   since	   it	   is	   outside	   the	   scientific	   description	   of	   facts,	  
something	  to	  be	  found	  precisely	  in	  the	  order	  of	  ethics	  and	  aesthetic.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  
proposition	  6.44	  of	  the	  Tractatus:	  «It	  is	  not	  how	  things	  are	  in	  the	  world	  that	  is	  mystical,	  
but	   that	   it	   exists»,	   is	   clarified	   in	   the	   Lecture	   on	   Ethics,	   where	  Wittgenstein	   describes,	  
without	  using	  the	  term	  «mystical»,	  what	  he	  calls	  his	  «experience	  par	  excellence»:	  «I	  be-­‐
lieve	  that	  the	  best	  way	  of	  describing	  it	  is	  to	  say	  that	  when	  I	  have	  it,	  I	  wonder	  at	  the	  ex-­‐
istence	  of	   the	  world».	   It	   is	   indeed	   the	   experience	  of	   «seeing	   the	  world	   as	   a	  miracle»:	  
hence,	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  analogy	  between	  mystical	  and	  aesthetic	  experience.	  In	  the	  
Notebooks,	  moreover,	  we	  read:	  «Aesthetically,	  the	  miracle	  is	  that	  the	  world	  exists»	  (NB:	  
86,	  20.10.1916),	  and	  again:	  «We	  feel	  that	  even	  if	  all	  possible	  scientific	  questions	  are	  an-­‐
swered	  our	  problem	  is	  still	  not	  touched	  at	  all»	  (NB:	  51,	  25.5.1915).	  Thus,	  if	  Wittgenstein	  
does	  not	  doubt	  that	  we	  can	  understand	  the	  propositions	  enunciated	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  on	  
logic,	   ethics	   and	  aesthetics,	  which	  have	  «no	   sense»	   in	   that	   they	  do	  not	   correspond	   to	  
the	  relations	  between	  certain	  objects	  in	  the	  world,	  this	  is	  because	  here	  he	  already	  saw	  
what	  he	  would	   later	  present	   in	  his	  Philosophical	   Investigations,	   i.e.	   that	   language	  does	  
not	  have	  the	  mere	  function	  of	  designating	  objects	  or	  translating	  thoughts,	  and	  that	  the	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act	   of	   understanding	   a	   sentence	   is	  much	  more	   similar	   than	   one	   believes	   to	   what	   we	  
usually	  call	  «understanding	  a	  musical	  theme».	  
Not	  only,	  but	  one	  of	  the	  central	  points	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  is	  that	  language	  cannot	  «say	  
itself»,	   which	   is	   connected	   to	   Wittgenstein’s	   fundamental	   thought:	   what	   can	   be	  
«shown»	  cannot	  be	  «said»,	   a	  notion	  explicitly	   formulated	   in	   the	  Tractatus,	   but	   in	   fact	  
present	   –	   albeit	   implicitly	   –	   in	   the	  development	  of	   all	   his	   subsequent	   reflections	   from	  
the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	   to	   the	  Remarks	   on	   the	   Philosophy	   of	   Psychology	   (it	   is,	  
however,	   a	  decisive	  motif	   for	   a	   large	  part	  of	   twentieth-­‐century	  philosophy,	   covering	  a	  
trajectory	  that	  goes	  at	  least	  from	  Nietzsche	  to	  Adorno).	  Wittgenstein	  shows	  us,	  indeed,	  
that	  sense	  is	  ultimately	  formed	  within	   language	  itself,	  at	  the	  very	  moment	   in	  which	  he	  
puts	   before	   our	   eyes	   that	  what	  makes	   the	   sense	   of	   a	   proposition	   possible	   cannot	   be	  
said,	  but	  in	  fact	  only	  shown.	  For	  this	  reason,	  we	  cannot	  say	  that	  there	  is	  language,	  since	  
every	  there	  is	  for	  humankind	  is	  already	  generated	  in	  language:	  the	  result	  is	  that	  we	  can	  
never	  overcome	  the	  limits	  of	  language	  itself.	  However,	  already	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  for	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  language	  does	  not	  only	  say	  what	  can	  be	  said,	  that	  is	  what	  can	  be	  represented;	  
what	  is	  really	  important	  is	  not	  what	  language	  tells	  us,	  but	  what	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  tend	  to.	  In	  
the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	   in	  particular,	  Wittgenstein’s	  pivotal	   idea	  –	  an	   idea	  that	  
has	  decisive	  consequences	  –	  is	  that	  language	  does	  not	  have	  only	  the	  purpose	  of	  naming	  
or	  designating	  objects,	  or	  of	  translating	  thoughts:	  in	  short,	  language	  is	  primarily	  intend-­‐
ed	  not	  to	  inform,	  but	  to	  form.	  
In	  this	  perspective,	  the	  mystical	  comes	  from	  the	  awareness	  of	  the	  impossibility	  of	  giv-­‐
ing	  sense	  to	  the	  world,	  its	  existence	  and	  its	  totality,	  from	  within	  the	  world	  or	  from	  within	  
language.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  there	  is	  a	  radical	  contingentism	  to	  the	  Tractatus:	  «No	  
part	  of	  our	  experience	  is	  at	  the	  same	  time	  a	  priori.	  Whatever	  we	  see	  could	  also	  be	  other	  
than	  it	  is.	  Whatever	  we	  can	  describe	  at	  all	  could	  be	  other	  than	  it	  is.	  There	  is	  no	  a	  priori	  
order	  of	  things»	  (TLP:	  §	  5.634).	  This	  means	  that	  what	  we	  must	  pass	  over	  in	  silence	  is	  in-­‐
deed	  contained	  in	  language,	  but	  is	  not	  the	  contents	  of	  language.	  In	  fact,	  at	  a	  closer	  look,	  
far	   from	  banishing	   the	   notion	   of	   the	   ineffable,	   language	   unveils	   it:	   for	   this	   reason	  we	  
must	   accept	   to	   use	   a	   logically	   incorrect	   language,	  which	   does	   not	   represent	   anything,	  
but	  rather	  evokes.	  Hence	  the	  incantatory	  value	  of	  language,	  with	  the	  result	  that	  its	  fun-­‐
damental	   form	  could	  be	  poetry,	  which	  makes	   the	  world	  appear	  before	  us,	  at	   the	  very	  
moment	  in	  which	  it	  makes	  us	  feel	  the	  silence	  (the	  Mystical	  of	  the	  Tractatus	  that,	  as	  we	  
will	  see,	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  is	  presented	  as	  «the	  hidden	  nonsense»)	  with	  
which	  words	  are	  charged,	  and	  which	   is	   instead	  concealed	  by	  communicative	   language.	  
The	  entire	  Tractatus	  can	  then	  be	  summarised	  as	  follows:	  «What	  expresses	  itself	   in	  lan-­‐
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guage,	  we	  cannot	  express	  by	  means	  of	   language»	  (TLP:	  §	  4.121).	   In	  short,	   if	  we	  cannot	  
represent	   the	   irrepresentable,	   this	   is	   because	   it	   shows	  precisely	   and	  only	   in	   language.	  
But	   exactly	  because	  we	  are	   in	   language,	   and	  we	   cannot	   get	  out	  of	   it,	   then	   transcend-­‐
ence,	   as	   irrepressible	   excess,	   is	   something	   that	   is	   shown	   to	   us,	   only	   from	  within	   lan-­‐
guage.	  	  
In	  this	  sense,	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  «What	  we	  do	  is	  
to	  bring	  words	  back	  from	  their	  metaphysical	  to	  their	  everyday	  use»	  (PI:	  §	  116):	  this	  re-­‐
turn	   to	   the	   «everyday»	   is	   Wittgenstein’s	   hallmark	   in	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations.	  
Too	   often,	   indeed,	   philosophers	   have	   the	   illusion	   that	   they	   are	   looking	   for	   depth	   and	  
wonder	  beyond	  everyday	  language,	  without	  realising	  that	  exactly	  the	  most	  obvious	  and	  
familiar	  things	  should	  surprise	  us	  (according	  already	  to	  the	  Platonic	  idea	  that	  philosophy	  
stems	  from	  wonder):	  «The	  aspects	  of	  things	  that	  are	  most	  important	  for	  us	  are	  hidden	  
because	  of	  their	  simplicity	  and	  familiarity.	  (One	  is	  unable	  to	  notice	  something	  –	  because	  
it	   is	   always	   before	   one’s	   eyes)»	   (PI:	   §	   129).	   Hence,	   then,	   the	   crucial	   importance	   of	   a	  
statement	  such	  as	  the	  one	  we	  find	  in	  Culture	  and	  Value,	  dated	  1940:	  «How	  hard	  it	  is	  for	  
me	  to	  see	  what	   is	  right	   in	  front	  of	  my	  eyes»	  (CV:	  MS	  117	  160	  c;	  10.2.1940)	   in	  pointing	  
out	   the	   non-­‐obviousness	   of	   the	   datum,	   namely	   its	   ability	   to	   reveal	   something	   that	   is	  
other	  from	  itself,	  such	  a	  statement	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  counterpart	  of	  the	  famous	  line	  from	  
Joyce’s	  Ulysses,	  «Close	  your	  eyes	  and	  see»,	  which	  expresses	   the	  very	  sense	  of	  wonder	  
generated	  by	  the	  sudden	  showing	  forth	  of	  what,	  in	  the	  datum,	  offers	  itself	  to	  us	  as	  other	  
from	  the	  datum	  itself	  and,	  as	  such,	  escapes	  the	  optical-­‐retinal	  vision.	  
3.	  Wittgenstein’s	   Anti-­‐Foundationalism	   and	   the	   Recognition	   of	   the	   Autonomy	   of	   Lan-­‐
guage	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  exactly	  as	  he	  wonders	  at	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  world,	  Wittgen-­‐
stein	   also	   wonders	   at	   the	   obviousness	   of	   everyday	   language.	   And	   if	   the	   Tractatus	   al-­‐
ready	  assumed	  the	  insurmountable	  character	  of	   language,	  on	  this	   issue	  the	  Philosophi-­‐
cal	   Investigations	   are	   even	   more	   explicit:	   «Our	   mistake	   is	   to	   look	   for	   an	   explanation	  
where	   we	   ought	   to	   regard	   the	   facts	   as	   “proto-­‐phenomena”	   [Urphänomene].	   That	   is,	  
where	  we	  ought	  to	  say:	  this	  is	  the	  language-­‐game	  that	  is	  being	  played»	  (PI:	  §	  654).	  The	  
term	  Urphänomen	  is,	  most	  likely,	  a	  reference	  to	  Goethe:	  it	  designates	  a	  dimension	  that	  
the	  philosopher	  can	  only	  describe,	  and	  this	  is	  due	  to	  the	  impossibility	  of	  explaining	  eve-­‐
ryday	   language,	  which	  –	  as	  mentioned	  above	  –	   is	   insuperable	  for	  us	  and	  which,	  conse-­‐
quently,	  constitutes	  the	  condition	  itself	  for	  any	  explanation	  (cf.	  PI:	  §§	  81-­‐108).	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In	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations,	   Wittgenstein	   refuses	   to	   seek	   outside	   everyday	  
language	  itself	  the	  rules	  that	  govern	  its	  correct	  use.	  Thus,	  if	  in	  the	  Tractatus	  logic	  is	  an	  a	  
priori	   that	  cannot	  be	  surmounted,	   in	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations	   it	   is	   instead	  «lan-­‐
guage-­‐games»	  that	  constitute	  the	  insurmountable	  limits	  within	  which	  meaningful	  prop-­‐
ositions	  can	  be	   formed.	   In	   this	   light,	  according	   to	  Wittgenstein,	  we	  do	  not	  understand	  
language	  in	  itself,	  but	  rather	  a	  specific	  language-­‐game,	  by	  putting	  ourselves	  inside	  it;	  in	  
this	  sense,	  that	  every	  game	  works	  according	  to	  its	  own	  rules	  is	  to	  say	  that	  there	  are	  no	  
meanings	   in	  themselves	  that	   language	  subsequently	  expresses,	   i.e.	  there	  are	  no	  mean-­‐
ings	  existing	   independently	  of	   the	   linguistic	  activity	  of	  human	  beings.	  This	   is	  why	  Witt-­‐
genstein	  rejects	  any	  exact	  correspondence	  between	  words	  and	  definite	  objects,	  whose	  
meaning	   would	   somehow	   pre-­‐exist	   language.	   Thus	   we	   must	   always	   presuppose	   lan-­‐
guage	  when	  we	  want	   to	  account	   for	   the	   fact	   that	   language	  has	  some	  meaning.	  There-­‐
fore,	  human	  language	  cannot	  discover	  meanings	  that	  exist	  outside	  of	  itself;	  consequent-­‐
ly,	  understanding	  a	  proposition	  is	  not	  equivalent	  to	  referring	  it	  to	  a	  pre-­‐existent	  mean-­‐
ing,	  previously	  known	  by	  thought.	  Everything,	  in	  short,	  lies	  open	  in	  front	  of	  us	  and	  there	  
is	  nothing	  to	  explain	  (cf.	  PI:	  §	  126).	  
The	  fact	  that	  we	  philosophise	   in	   language	  means,	  then,	  that	  it	  is	  not	  the	  object	  that	  
gives	  the	  sign	  its	  meaning,	  but	  it	  is	  the	  sign	  that	  induces	  us	  to	  think	  the	  object	  through	  
its	  meaning.	  This	  is	  to	  say	  that	  language	  gives	  us	  the	  illusion	  of	  being	  a	  system	  of	  signs	  
that	  function	  as	   intermediaries	  between	  our	  thought	  and	  objects	  –	  an	   illusion	  which	   is	  
exposed	  when	  we	   realise	   that	  without	   language	   there	  are	  neither	  «thought»	  nor	  «ob-­‐
jects».	  And	  it	   is	  precisely	  by	  running	  up	  against	  the	  limits	  of	   language	  that	  the	  philoso-­‐
pher	  discovers	  that	  his	  reflection	  is	  possible	  only	  within	  language	  itself.	  It	  would	  be	  nec-­‐
essary	  to	  be	  «outside	  language»	  to	  be	  able	  to	  make	  each	  word	  correspond	  to	  a	  distinct	  
idea.	  One	  such	  limit	   is	  evident	  in	  the	  impossibility	  of	   identifying	  an	  absolute	  beginning,	  
functioning	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  philosophical	  reflection,	  as	  well	  as	   in	  the	   impossibility	  
of	  carrying	  out	  a	  totally	  complete	  analysis	  and	  deduction.	  The	  fact	  is	  that	  right	  when	  we	  
reflect	  on	  comprehension,	  we	  realise	  the	  existence	  of	  elements	  that	  cannot	  be	  reduced	  
to	  conceptual	  thought.	  	  
Hence,	   throughout	   Wittgenstein’s	   work,	   the	   recurring	   comparison	   between	   music	  
and	  verbal	  language,	  that	  is	  between	  understanding	  a	  proposition	  and	  understanding	  a	  
musical	   theme;	   it	   is	   no	   coincidence,	   as	   hinted	   above,	   that	  Wittgenstein	  himself	   in	   the	  
Philosophical	   Investigations	   affirms:	   «Understanding	   a	   sentence	   in	   language	   is	   much	  
more	  akin	  to	  understanding	  a	  theme	  in	  music	  than	  one	  may	  think»	  (PI:	  §	  527).	  The	  point	  
is	  that	  for	  Wittgenstein	  music	   is	  something	  that	  shows	   itself	  –	  exactly	  as	  silence	  shows	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itself	  in	  words	  –	  but	  that	  cannot	  be	  enunciated,	  and	  this	  because	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  musi-­‐
cal	   phrase	   lies	  within	   it,	   beyond	   any	   sound/thought	   dualism.	  Well,	   also	   everyday	   lan-­‐
guage	  –	  although,	  unlike	  music	  and	  poetry,	  it	  does	  not	  make	  us	  perceive	  silence	  –	  does	  
not	  refer	  to	  anything	  external,	  being	  rather	  the	  condition	  that	  makes	  the	  perception	  of	  
things	   possible:	   in	   short,	   language	   says	   nothing	   but	   itself	   and	   its	   sense	   is	   inseparable	  
from	  it.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  against	  the	  logic	  of	  the	  double,	  Wittgenstein	  underlines	  
that	  the	  meaning	  of	  a	  statement	  is	  immanent	  in	  its	  very	  structure.	  
It	  is	  no	  coincidence	  that,	  in	  the	  Notebooks	  written	  before	  the	  Tractatus,	  Wittgenstein	  
declares:	  «The	  proposition	  represents	  the	  situation	  –	  as	  it	  were	  off	  its	  own	  bat»	  (NB:	  26,	  
5.11.1914)	  hence,	  moreover,	  his	  refusal	  to	  define	  mental	  states,	  desires,	  sensations	  and	  
feelings	   as	   transcendent	   entities,	   independent	   of	   our	   linguistic	   paradigms:	   there	   is	   no	  
such	  thing	  as	  sensation	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  and,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  word	  that	  denotes	  
and	   represents	   it.	   Feelings	  and	  emotions	  are	  not	   translated	   into	   language,	  but	   inhabit	  
language	  itself,	  just	  as	  –	  in	  Nietzschean	  terms	  –	  pathos	  inhabits	  logos.	  The	  crucial	  point	  
then	  is	  that	  the	  expression	  of	  an	  experience	  does	  not	  consist	  in	  the	  denotation	  of	  a	  psy-­‐
chological	  process:	  we	  understand	  a	  symbol,	  a	  statement,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  we	  recog-­‐
nise	   the	  expression	  of	   a	   face	  or	   a	   gesture;	   as	   a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   recognising	   a	   face	   in	   a	  
drawing,	  or	  even	  a	  proposition	  in	  a	  set	  of	  signs,	  does	  not	  mean	  comparing	  two	  distinct	  
visual	  objects.	  Thus,	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  Wittgenstein	  avoids	  explanations	  
and	  theories,	  employing	  instead	  the	  special	  description	  he	  calls	  «perspicuous	  represen-­‐
tation»:	   it	   is,	   as	  we	   shall	   see,	   a	   notion	   taken	   from	  Goethe,	  who	   saw	   connections	   be-­‐
tween	  one	  plant	  and	  another,	  between	  one	  animal	  and	  another;	  but,	  most	  of	  all,	  it	  is	  the	  
kind	  of	  understanding	  we	  can	  have	  of	  a	  piece	  of	  music,	  a	  poem,	  or	  any	  other	  work	  of	  art.	  
But	   if	   it	   is	   true,	  as	  we	  saw,	  that	   the	  distinction	  between	  «saying»	  and	  «showing»	   is	  
for	  Wittgenstein	  the	  «central	  problem	  of	  philosophy»,	  then,	  in	  this	  perspective,	  the	  un-­‐
sayable	  is	  contained	  in	  what	  is	  said;	  hence	  Wittgenstein’s	  ideal:	  to	  communicate	  the	  in-­‐
expressible	  without	   trying	   to	  express	   it.	  So,	   it	   is	  precisely	  because	  philosophy	  can	  only	  
«show»	  that,	   from	  this	  point	  of	  view,	   it	  has	  a	   form	  similar	   to	  that	  of	  poetry.	  However,	  
whereas	  the	  Tractatus	  emphasises	  that	  what	  cannot	  be	  said	  (the	  mystical,	   the	  unsaya-­‐
ble)	  can	  only	  be	  shown,	  what	  emerges	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	  is	  the	  need	  not	  
to	  show	  the	  reader	  what	  cannot	  be	  said,	  but	  to	   induce	  him	  to	  see	   in	  a	  different	  way	  –	  
thanks	   to	   what	  Wittgenstein	   calls	   «perspicuous	   vision»	   –	   what	   he	   has	   always	   had	   in	  
front	  of	  his	  eyes;	  this	  results	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  ineffable	  that	  the	  Tractatus	   located	  
outside	  the	  limits	  of	  language,	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations	   is	  placed	  in	  language-­‐
games.	  Hence,	  once	  again,	  not	  the	  opposition	  of	  «saying»	  and	  «showing»	  expressed	  in	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the	  Tractatus,	  but	  their	  mutual	   implication.	   In	  this	   light,	  Wittgenstein	  denies	  the	  trans-­‐
cendent	  existence	  of	  universal	   concepts	  and	   the	  notions	   themselves	  of	  «essence»	  and	  
«unity»,	  reducing	  them	  to	  «family	  resemblances»;	  in	  this	  way	  he,	  like	  Musil,	  is	  aware	  of	  
the	  loss	  of	  sense	  of	  a	  coherent	  and	  unitary	  reality:	  what	  remains	  is	  a	  fragmentary	  reality,	  
a	  reality,	  that	  is,	  unfounded,	  in	  which	  the	  language-­‐game	  itself	  has	  no	  justification,	  but	  is	  
rather	   the	  manifestation	  of	  an	  unfounded	  praxis.	   In	   this	  perspective,	   it	   seems	  unques-­‐
tionable	   that	  Wittgenstein	   adopts	   an	   anti-­‐foundationalist	   point	   of	   view,	   very	   close	   to	  
Ernst	  Mach’s,	  when	  he	  observes,	   in	  On	  Certainty,	  that	  each	  proposition	  can	  be	  derived	  
from	  other	  propositions,	  but	   this	  does	  not	   imply	   that	   the	   latter	  are	  more	  certain	   than	  
the	  derived	  propositions:	  «At	  the	  foundation	  of	  well-­‐founded	  belief	  lies	  belief	  that	  is	  not	  
founded»	  (OC:	  §	  253).	  
That	   philosophy	   then,	   according	   to	  Wittgenstein,	   leaves	   «everything	   as	   it	   is»	   (PI:	   §	  
124)	   means	   that	   it	   does	   not	   touch	   the	   ground	   where	   the	   game	   of	   true	   and	   false	   is	  
played,	  and	  this	  because	  philosophy	  itself,	  far	  from	  pretending	  to	  explain,	  limits	  itself	  to	  
describing.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  is	  language-­‐games,	  in	  themselves	  neither	  true	  nor	  false,	  
that	  open	  up	  the	  possibility	  of	  practicing	  the	  concepts	  of	  true	  and	  false.	  What	  we	  believe	  
in	  is	  not	  then,	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  a	  single	  proposition	  that	  strikes	  us	  for	  its	  evi-­‐
dence,	  but	  the	  whole	  language-­‐game	  with	  which	  the	  proposition	  is	  connected,	  and	  this	  
because	  a	  statement	  does	  not	  have	  a	  meaning	  in	  itself,	  outside	  of	  the	  context	  where	  it	  is	  
inserted:	  what	  we	  believe,	  in	  this	  sense,	  is	  believed	  within	  a	  grammatical	  paradigm,	  and	  
not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  an	  epistemological	  evidence,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  Wittgenstein	  goes	  as	  
far	  as	  claiming	  that	  «essence	  is	  expressed	  in	  grammar»	  (PI:	  §	  371):	  «Grammar	  tells	  what	  
kind	  of	  object	  anything	   is.	   (Theology	  as	  grammar)»	   (PI:	  §	  373).	  This	  means	   that	  we	  do	  
not	  recognise	  anything	  as	  it	  is	  in	  itself,	  but	  as	  it	  appears	  through	  the	  filter	  of	  a	  grammati-­‐
cal	  pattern.	  In	  this	  sense,	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  objects	  we	  talk	  about	  are	  not	  given	  enti-­‐
ties	  to	  be	  discovered,	  but	  entities	  to	  be	  built;	  in	  the	  same	  way,	  both	  according	  to	  Hein-­‐
rich	  Hertz	  and	  according	  to	  Ludwig	  Boltzmann,	  scientific	  theories	  do	  not	  reflect	  things	  as	  
they	  are	  in	  themselves,	  but	  supply	  models	  through	  which	  to	  filter	  the	  reality	  of	  the	  phys-­‐
ical	  world.	  For	  Hertz	  indeed,	  as	  well	  as	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  the	  relation	  between	  models	  or	  
representations	  and	  physical	  phenomena	  is	  an	  internal	  relation;	  and	  also	  for	  Boltzmann,	  
reality	   is	   filtered	   through	   an	   apparatus	   of	   grammatical	   models,	   which	   do	   not	   reflect	  
things	  as	  they	  are	  in	  themselves.	  
Once	   again	   then,	   according	   to	  Wittgenstein,	   language	   expresses	   what	   it	   expresses	  
«off	  its	  own	  bat»,	  meaning	  by	  this	  the	  internal	  relation	  that	  necessarily	  exists	  between	  a	  
proposition	  and	  a	  fact:	  language	  speaks	  for	  itself,	  being	  the	  testimony	  and	  not	  the	  con-­‐
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sequence	  of	  a	  belief	  external	  to	  it;	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  Wittgenstein	  writes:	  «The	  prece-­‐
dent	   to	   which	   we	   are	   constantly	   inclined	   to	   appeal	  must	   reside	   in	   the	   symbol	   itself»	  
(TLP:	  §	  5.525).	  This,	  then,	  is	  Wittgenstein’s	  expressivism	  which,	  against	  any	  intellectual-­‐
ism,	  he	  himself	  defines	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  elements	  of	  continuity	  between	  the	  Tractatus	  
and	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations:	  the	  intention	  is	  already	  contained	  in	  the	  words	  that	  
express	  it,	  exactly	  as	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  an	  expectation	  is	  inextricably	  connected	  with	  the	  
expectation	  itself,	  or	  as	  a	  concept	  is	  not	  distinct	  from	  the	  set	  of	  examples	  that	  illustrate	  
its	  possible	  uses.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  what	  emerges	  is	  in	  the	  first	  place	  the	  autono-­‐
my	  of	  language,	  with	  the	  ensuing	  exclusion	  of	  any	  possible	  intelligible	  depth	  located	  be-­‐
yond	  or	  beneath	  surface,	   that	   is	  beyond	  what	  can	  be	  perceived	  by	   the	  senses.	  Hence,	  
then,	  Wittgenstein’s	  claim	  in	  Culture	  and	  Value	  that	  «the	  limit	  of	  language	  manifests	  it-­‐
self	  in	  the	  impossibility	  of	  describing	  the	  fact	  that	  corresponds	  to	  […]	  a	  sentence	  without	  
simply	  repeating	  the	  sentence»	  (CV:	  MS	  110	  61;	  10.2.1931).	  
4.	   The	   Presence	   of	   Goethe’s	   Morphology	   in	   Wittgenstein’s	   Reflection:	   The	   Notions	   of	  
«Perspicuity»	  and	  «Family	  Resemblances»	  
A	  language-­‐game	  can	  then	  be	  understood	  only	  by	  comparing	  it	  to	  other	  games,	  real	  or	  
possible:	  this	   is	  precisely	  what	  the	  notion	  of	  «perspicuity»	  consists	  in.	  Particularly	  after	  
the	  Tractatus,	  Wittgenstein	   is	  deeply	   influenced	  –	  as	  already	  mentioned	  –	  by	  Goethe’s	  
morphological	  thought,	  according	  to	  which	  the	  vehicle	  of	  thought	  is,	  exactly	  as	  for	  Witt-­‐
genstein,	  language	  itself.	  By	  «morphological»	  thought	  Goethe	  means	  an	  inquiry	  into	  na-­‐
ture	  that	  does	  not	   look	   for	   the	  hidden	  causes	  of	  phenomena	  but	   that,	   looking	  at	   their	  
surface,	  is	  interested	  in	  their	  exterior	  forms,	  with	  which	  they	  manifest	  themselves	  to	  the	  
eyes	   of	   an	   observer.	   With	   such	   morphology,	   Goethe	   wants	   to	   contrast	   Newtonian	  
mechanicism	  –	   very	  widespread	  at	  his	   time	  –	  which	  aimed	  at	  discovering,	  beyond	   the	  
appearance	  of	   sensible	  phenomena,	   the	  deep	  mechanisms	  able	   to	  explain	   them;	  mor-­‐
phology,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  focuses	  exclusively	  on	  the	  visible,	  without	  postulating	  the	  ex-­‐
istence	  of	  an	  invisible	  essence	  beyond	  it.	  The	  idea	  that	  in	  nature	  nothing	  happens	  which	  
is	  not	  related	  to	  the	  whole	  is	  then	  the	  anti-­‐essentialist	  assumption	  that	  enables	  Goethe	  
to	  develop,	   along	   the	   traditional	   static	   concept	  of	   form,	   the	  morphological	   concept	  of	  
dynamic	  relations	  among	  different	  possible	  forms.	   It	   is	  no	  coincidence	  that	  Goethe	  ex-­‐
plicitly	  declares	  that	  he	  is	  not	  interested	  in	  the	  causes	  of	  phenomena	  and	  that	  he	  does	  
not	  want	   to	   look	  at	  what	   is	  behind	   them:	  «Don’t	  go	   looking	   for	  anything	  beyond	  phe-­‐
nomena:	  they	  are	  themselves	  what	  they	  teach,	  the	  doctrine»	  (Goethe	  [1998]:	  77,	  §	  575).	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This	  means	  that	  phenomena	  always	  manifest	  to	  our	  sight	  the	  network	  of	  relations	  that	  
«perspicuously»	   connects	   them;	   and	   it	   is	   precisely	   at	   such	   connection	   of	   phenomena	  
that	  morphology	   looks.	   So,	   just	  because	   there	   isn’t	   for	  Goethe	  any	  hidden	  essence	  on	  
the	  basis	  of	  which	  the	  notion	  of	  «form»	  can	  be	  defined	  once	  for	  all,	  the	  morphological	  
point	  of	  view	   implies	   the	   idea	  of	  «metamorphosis»,	  of	  a	  continuous	   transformation	  of	  
the	   identical	  and,	  at	   the	  same	  time,	  of	   form	   itself,	  with	   the	  ensuing	  recognition	  of	   the	  
dynamic	  and	  evolving	  character	  of	  the	  latter.	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	  fact	  that	  form	  is	  always	  
inscribed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  its	  transformations	  means	  that	  it	  should	  be	  conceived	  of	  not	  
as	  a	  Gestalt	  –	  a	  «formed	   form»	  –	  but	   rather	  as	  a	  Gestaltung	  –	  a	  «form	   in	   formation»,	  
with	  the	  result	  that	  its	  unity	  necessarily	  implies	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  its	  various	  manifesta-­‐
tions,	  among	  which	  –	  in	  Wittgenstein’s	  words	  –	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  to	  grasp	  a	  network	  
of	   similarities	   and	   differences	  which	   at	   the	   same	   time	   appear	   and	   disappear	   (cf.	   PI:	   §	  
66).	  Hence,	  even	   for	  Wittgenstein,	   the	  awareness	  of	   the	  original	  character	  of	   the	  phe-­‐
nomenon,	   i.e.	   of	   the	   single	   «language-­‐game»,	   deriving	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   «nothing	   is	  
hidden»,	  that	  everything	  is	  «already	  in	  plain	  view».	  
Thus,	  resuming	  Goethe’s	  morphological	  project,	  Wittgenstein	  goes	  as	  far	  as	  asserting	  
that	  «nature	  has	  neither	  stone	  nor	  skin»,	  meaning	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  abolish	  not	  only	  
a	  presumed	  essence	  of	  language,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  idea	  of	  purpose	  inherent	  in	  it,	  but	  also	  
any	  distinction	  between	  surface	  and	  depth,	  and	  consequently	  between	  visible	  and	  invis-­‐
ible.	  On	  this	   issue,	  Wittgenstein	  states	   in	  the	  Philosophical	   Investigations:	  «don’t	  think,	  
but	   look»	   (PI:	   §	   66),	  meaning:	   do	   not	   try	   to	   explain	   facts	   tracing	   them	   back	   to	   other	  
facts,	  according	  to	  the	  model	  of	  scientific	  theories.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  what	  is	  important	  
from	  the	  morphological	  or	  grammatical	  point	  of	  view	  is	  to	  see	  the	  multiplicity	  of	  exam-­‐
ples,	  which	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  concept	  is	  made	  up	  of,	  as	  a	  sequence	  of	  cases	  among	  which	  
there	  are	   relations	  of	   similarity	   and	  difference.	  As	   a	  matter	  of	   fact,	   employing	   the	  ex-­‐
pression	   «family	   resemblances»,	   Wittgenstein	   appropriates	   Goethe’s	   idea	   of	   seeing,	  
among	   these	  cases,	  passages	  and	   transitions:	   it	   is	  no	  coincidence	   that	  he	  uses	  expres-­‐
sions	  such	  as	  «links»	  and	  «intermediate	  links»;	  for	  this	  reason,	  in	  paragraph	  122,	  he	  as-­‐
serts:	  «Hence	  the	  importance	  of	  finding	  and	  inventing	  intermediate	  links»	  (PI:	  §	  122),	  in	  
the	  sense	  that	   it	   is	  precisely	  by	   inventing	   these	  «intermediate	   links»	  that	  Wittgenstein	  
intends	  to	  achieve	  that	  «perspicuous	  representation»	  which	  means	  indeed	  «seeing	  con-­‐
nections».	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  Wittgenstein’s	  anti-­‐essentialism	   is	  one	  with	  his	   recognition	  
of	  the	  indivisibility	  of	  the	  internal	  and	  the	  external,	  where	  it	   is	  precisely	  interiority	  that	  
constitutes	  the	  axis	  around	  which	  the	  philosopher’s	  conception	  of	  art	  is	  articulated.	  Art	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is	  indeed	  the	  spring	  of	  an	  «invention»	  that	  enriches	  and	  renovates	  our	  vision	  of	  interiori-­‐
ty.	  So,	   if	  privileging	  the	   invisible	   is	  a	  strong	  trend	   in	  20th	  century	   thought,	   for	  Wittgen-­‐
stein,	  on	  the	  contrary,	  we	  can	  find	  such	  invisible	  only	  within	  the	  visible:	  in	  this	  sense,	  it	  is	  
just	  and	  only	  art	  which,	  in	  an	  exemplary	  way,	  is	  able	  to	  manifest	  that	  invisible	  depth	  in	  
the	  visible	  which	  would	  otherwise	  be	  denied	  to	  us.	  Moreover,	  a	  poem’s	  words,	  a	  musical	  
phrase,	  a	  portrait	  are	  not	  valuable	  for	  what	  they	  might	  say	  or	  explain,	  but	  precisely	  for	  
what	  eludes	  any	  such	  efforts.	  As	  Edmond	  Jabès	  maintains:	  «Mysterious	  is	  the	  light,	  not	  
the	  obscurity,	  of	  the	  book»	  (Jabès	  [1984]:	  87).	  Not	  only,	  but	  such	  interiority	  manifested	  
by	  the	  work	  is	  not,	  in	  any	  way,	  to	  be	  confused	  with	  inspiration	  and	  with	  the	  artist’s	  state	  
of	  mind:	  this	  is	  why	  we	  must	  turn	  our	  eyes	  on	  the	  works	  in	  order	  to	  «see»	  not	  what	  they	  
«say»	  but	  what	  they	  «show»	  us.	  And	  it	  is	  precisely	  in	  this	  sense	  that	  for	  Wittgenstein,	  as	  
well	  as	  for	  Maurice	  Merleau-­‐Ponty	  and	  Paul	  Klee,	  works	  «look	  at	  us».	  
5.	  The	  Identity-­‐Difference	  of	  Condition	  and	  Conditioned;	  The	  Relation	  between	  «Family»,	  
«Class»	  and	  «Individual»	  
More	   broadly,	   from	   the	   Tractatus	   to	   the	   Philosophical	   Investigations,	   Wittgenstein’s	  
central	   problem	   is	   to	   establish	   at	  what	   condition	   language	   refers	   to	   the	  world.	   In	   the	  
Tractatus,	   such	   condition	   –	   as	  mentioned	   above	   –	   is	   found	   in	   the	   identity	   of	   «logical	  
form»	  between	  a	  proposition	  and	  a	  fact;	  this	  «logical	  form»,	  however,	  being	  a	  condition,	  
cannot	  be	  said,	  but	  only	  «shown»,	  from	  within	  the	  proposition	  itself.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  
as	  already	  pointed	  out,	  logic	  is	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  meaningfulness	  of	  a	  proposition,	  that	  
is	  of	  an	  image:	  hence	  Wittgenstein’s	  assertion	  that	  «nothing	  is	  more	  fundamental	  than	  
logic»,	   resulting	   from	   the	   fact	   that	   logic	   itself	   is	   recognised	   as	   «transcendental».	   But	  
such	  logical	  condition	  implies	  a	  sacrifice:	  of	  the	  particular,	  of	  the	  determined,	  and	  thus	  
of	  the	  individual.	  What	  is	  relevant	  from	  the	  logical	  point	  of	  view	  of	  the	  Tractatus	   is	  not	  
the	  «how»,	  that	   is	  the	  determined	  character	  of	  the	  proposition-­‐image,	  but	  the	  «what»	  
to	  which	  it	  refers	  –	  i.e.,	  employing	  Gottlob	  Frege’s	  term,	  the	  Bedeutung	  –	  and	  which	  can	  
be	   the	   referent	   of	   different	   propositions-­‐images	   –	   i.e.,	   again	   according	   to	   Frege,	   the	  
multiple	  Sinne.	  
Thus,	  Wittgenstein’s	   statement	   in	   the	  Tractatus	   that	   «Logic	  must	   look	   after	   itself»	  
(TLP:	  §	  5.473)	  indicates	  precisely	  that	  logic	  is	  extraneous	  to	  the	  determined,	  that	  is	  the	  
contingent,	  which,	   in	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations,	   is	   instead	   the	  decisive	   problem:	  
the	  problem	  which,	  as	  we	  saw,	   induces	  Wittgenstein	   to	  delve	  deeper	   into	  and	   rethink	  
the	  relation	  between	  condition	  and	  conditioned.	  It	  is	  however	  unquestionable	  that	  logic,	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as	  condition	  of	  possibility	  of	  the	  facts,	  comes	  before	  the	  How	  –	  how	  the	  world	  is	  (cf.	  TLP:	  
§	  5.552)	  –,	  but	  it	  definitely	  cannot	  explain	  the	  What	  of	  the	  world,	  i.e.	  the	  fact	  that	  some-­‐
thing	  happens	  and	  that,	  happening,	  presents	   itself	   in	  a	  certain	  way	  and	  not	  otherwise:	  
«that	   something	   happens»	   exceeds	   logic	   and,	   consequently,	   the	   world	   as	   totality	   of	  
facts;	  indeed,	  this	  is	  the	  dominion	  not	  of	  logic	  but	  of	  the	  Mystical.	  
From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  logical	  possibility	  that	  the	  image	  has	  of	  saying,	  that	  is	  of	  
representing	  or	   referring	   to,	   a	   fact	   constitutes	   the	  «transparency»	  of	   the	   image	   itself,	  
whereas	  what	  makes	  the	  image	  something	  particular,	  that	  is	  individual	  –	  and	  which,	  as	  
such,	   surpasses	   logical-­‐denotative	   sayability	   and	  appears	   as	  nonsense	  –	   constitutes	   its	  
«opacity»:	  this	   is	  exactly	  the	  «what»	  that	  can	  only	  be	  felt	  and	  not	  said;	  and	  it	   is	   in	  this	  
way	  that	  Wittgenstein	  recognises	  that	  «feeling»	  precedes	  logic,	  even	  if	  it	  is	  precisely	  this	  
what	   cannot	   be	   said.	   Then	   there	   is	   something	  more	   fundamental	   than	   logic,	   and	   this	  
means	  that	  it	  is	  only	  because	  we	  «feel»	  the	  particular	  that	  we	  can	  «think»	  the	  universal:	  
in	  short,	  we	  think	  (conceptually)	  because	  we	  feel.	  So,	  if	  opacity	  is	  this	  «what»	  –	  the	  inef-­‐
fable,	  the	  Mystical	  –,	  and	  if	  it	  is	  true	  that	  «there	  can	  never	  be	  surprises	  in	  logic»	  (TLP:	  §	  
6.1251),	  then	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  «what»	  –	  that	  something	  happens	  –	  that	  constitutes	  the	  
dimension	  able	  to	  surprise	  us;	  and	  this	  results,	  in	  the	  first	  place,	  from	  its	  logically	  unpre-­‐
dictable	  character.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  it	  is	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  logical-­‐denotative	  language	  
that	  the	  existence	  of	  the	  world	  appears	  as	  a	  «miracle»,	  that	  is	  as	  something	  that	  exceeds	  
any	  possible	  explanation,	   any	  possible	   sayability,	   and	   therefore	  any	  possible	  meaning-­‐
fulness.	  	  
In	  this	  perspective,	   if	  the	  sublimity	  of	   logic,	   in	  the	  Tractatus,	   implied	  a	  putting	  aside	  
of	  the	  particular,	  i.e.	  of	  the	  individual,	  now,	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  the	  focus	  
is	  precisely	  on	  the	  latter.	  The	  problem	  is	  then	  to	  understand	  something	  that	  is	  already	  in	  
front	  of	  our	  eyes	  –	  because	  it	  is	  exactly	  this	  that	  somehow	  we	  seem	  not	  to	  understand	  –	  
and	   that,	   on	   closer	   inspection,	   embodies	   that	   more	   originary	   condition	   referred	   to	  
above:	   the	   condition	  which,	   as	   such,	   cannot	   but	   be	   contained	   in	   the	   conditioned,	   but	  
which,	  on	   the	  other	  hand,	  exceeds	   it,	   thus	  appealing	  not	   to	  an	  understanding	  but,	   ra-­‐
ther,	  to	  a	  «knowing»	  which	  is,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  an	  authentic	  «feeling».	  Hence	  Wittgen-­‐
stein’s	   reference	   to	   Augustine	   concerning	   the	   question	   of	   time:	   for	   Wittgenstein,	   in-­‐
deed,	  «something	   that	  one	  knows	  when	  nobody	  asks	  one,	  but	  no	   longer	  knows	  when	  
one	  is	  asked	  to	  explain	  it,	   is	  something	  that	  has	  to	  be	  called	  to	  mind»	  (PI:	  §	  89).	  In	  this	  
sense,	  knowing	  is	  equivalent	  to	  remembering,	  but	  also	  –	  as	  we	  saw	  –	  to	  «seeing	  right	  in-­‐
to	  phenomena».	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  it	  is	  in	  phenomena	  that	  the	  condition,	  so	  to	  speak,	  
embodies	  itself,	  exactly	  as	  the	  invisible	  embodies	  itself	  in	  the	  visible	  and	  the	  unsayable	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in	  the	  sayable:	  such	  «embodying»	  constitutes	  indeed	  the	  memory	  that	  both	  the	  visible	  
and	  the	  sayable	  are	  charged	  with.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  it	  is	  precisely	  the	  logical	  unpredict-­‐
ability	  of	  a	  language-­‐game,	  of	  any	  game,	  the	  fact	  that	  it	   is	  not	  «everywhere»	  governed	  
by	   rules,	   and	   thus	   its	   «vagueness»,	   that	   makes	   that	   game	   possible	   as	   a	   determinate	  
game;	  the	  point	  is	  that	  the	  image	  we	  can	  devise	  of	  a	  thing,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  language-­‐game	  
in	  which	  we	  find	  ourselves	  acting	  each	  time,	  can	  never	  present	  itself	  as	  something	  «ex-­‐
actly»	  determinable	  (cf.	  PI:	  §	  70),	  since	  it	  presents	  itself	  rather	  as	  a	  necessarily	  «vague»	  
and	  «blurred»	  dimension;	  nevertheless,	  the	  fact	  that	  vagueness	  presents	  itself	  together	  
with	   definition	  means	   that	   the	   unsayable	   is	   not	   only	   connected	  with	   the	   sayable,	   but	  
that,	  upon	  closer	   inspection,	   it	   constitutes	   its	   internal	   condition	  of	  possibility.	   In	  other	  
words,	  something	  offers	  itself	  to	  us	  as	  a	  determinate	  and	  sayable	  datum	  only	  inasmuch	  
as	  such	  datum	  presents	  itself,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  as	  something	  vague	  and	  unsayable.	  	  
There	  is	  then,	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  a	  real	  short	  circuit	  between	  condi-­‐
tion	  and	  conditioned:	  we	  can	  even	  talk	  of	  a	  relationship	  of	  identity-­‐difference	  between	  
the	  two	  terms.	  This	  results	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  understanding	  the	  unity,	  as	  a	  unity	  exceed-­‐
ing	   the	   determined	   character	   of	   the	   particular,	   is	   one	   with	   understanding	   this	   deter-­‐
mined	  character,	  since	  the	  determined	  is	  such	  only	  because	  of	  that	  excess.	  This	  exceed-­‐
ing	  unity,	   indeed,	  by	  withdrawing	   itself	   from	  any	  possibility	   to	  be	  said	   in	  a	  meaningful	  
way,	  and	   thus	   from	  any	  possible	  use,	   is	   for	  Wittgenstein	  a	  proper	  «nonsense»:	  a	  non-­‐
sense	  which,	  being	  hidden	  in	  everything	  that	  is	  determined,	  turns	  out	  to	  be	  the	  very	  in-­‐
ternal	  condition	  of	  meaningfulness.	  Furthermore,	  being	  conditioned	  by	  nonsense,	  mean-­‐
ingfulness	  can	  never	  present	  itself	  as	  something	  conclusive,	  but	  rather	  as	  something	  that	  
must	  always	  and	  again	  be	  regained.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  task	  of	  philosophy,	  i.e.	  
of	  understanding,	  for	  Wittgenstein	  is	  «to	  pass	  from	  unobvious	  nonsense	  to	  obvious	  non-­‐
sense»	  (PI:	  §	  464),	  which	  means	  to	  make	  evident	  the	  nonsense	  –	  the	  vagueness	  –	  that	  is	  
hidden	  in	  what	  is	  determined.	  The	  problem	  then	  is	  not	  to	  say	  the	  nonsense	  –	  an	  impos-­‐
sible	  and	  contradictory	  endeavour	  –	  but	  to	  make	   it	  evident,	   through	  an	  understanding	  
consisting	  in	  making	  explicit,	  although	  never	  conclusively,	  the	  unity	  implicit	  in	  multiplici-­‐
ty.	  Thus,	   in	   the	  process	  of	  understanding,	  what	   is	  determined	   is	  not	  accepted	  as	  such,	  
but	  is	  questioned,	  so	  as	  to	  make	  emerge	  from	  it	  the	  unsayable	  which	  –	  as	  we	  saw	  –	  rep-­‐
resents	  its	  internal	  condition.	  
Moreover,	  for	  Wittgenstein	  the	  logical	  notion	  itself	  of	  «class»	  presupposes	  the	  non-­‐
logical,	  but	  aesthetic,	  notion	  of	  «family».	  This	  means	  that,	  in	  a	  set	  of	  objects,	  we	  «see»	  a	  
network	   of	   resemblances	   and	   dissimilarities,	   and	   it	   is	   precisely	   and	   exclusively	   on	   the	  
basis	  of	  such	  unity	  –	  the	  unity	  of	  the	  similarities	  and	  differences,	  which	  we	  «grasp	  at	  a	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stroke»	  –	  that	  we	  can	  classify	  that	  very	  set,	  attributing	  an	  order	  to	  it.	  In	  this	  case,	  which	  
is	  indeed	  the	  case	  of	  knowledge,	  the	  family	  unity	  is	  the	  principle	  of	  any	  conceptual	  unity,	  
in	  the	  functioning	  of	  which,	  however,	  «family	  resemblances»,	  although	  they	  constitute	  
its	   condition	  of	   possibility,	   have	  been	  put	   aside.	   In	   this	   sense,	   «family	   resemblances»,	  
and	  the	  principle	  of	  aesthetic	  unity	  they	  imply,	  are	  the	  internal	  condition	  of	  that	  condi-­‐
tioned	  which	  is	  the	  «class»,	  i.e.	  the	  condition	  of	  the	  proper	  logical	  principle	  that	  the	  no-­‐
tion	  of	  class	  implies.	  In	  knowledge	  then,	  and	  particularly	  in	  scientific	  knowledge,	  it	  is	  the	  
«family»,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  aesthetic	  principle	  forming	  its	  unity,	  that	  conditions	  our	  building	  
of	  «classes»,	   i.e.	  conceptual	  determinations.	   In	  the	  case	  of	  a	  work	  of	  art,	  however,	  the	  
function	  performed	  by	   family	   resemblances	   is	  different.	  But,	   to	  understand	  such	   func-­‐
tion,	   it	   is	   first	  necessary	  to	  analyse	  the	  theme	  of	   the	   image,	  which,	  as	  a	   fil	   rouge,	   runs	  
through	  Wittgenstein’s	  entire	  reflection.	  
6.	  The	  Question	  of	   the	   Image	  and	  Art	  as	  «Transition	   from	  Obvious	  Nonsense	   to	  Some-­‐
thing	  which	  is	  Unobvious	  Nonsense»	  
In	  this	  connection,	  particularly	  relevant	   is	  what	  Wittgenstein	  asserts	   in	  paragraphs	  522	  
and	  523	  of	   the	  Philosophical	   Investigations,	  where	  –	  comparing	   the	  notion	  of	  proposi-­‐
tion	  and	  that	  of	  image	  –	  he	  distinguishes	  a	  «portrait»	  from	  a	  «genre-­‐picture»:	  if	  the	  first	  
designates	  a	  kind	  of	  image	  which,	  being	  hetero-­‐referential,	  refers	  to	  something	  outside	  
of	  itself	  (and	  which,	  as	  such,	  can	  always	  be	  logically	  reformulated),	  the	  second	  is	  a	  kind	  
of	  image	  which,	  being	  self-­‐referential,	  «says	  itself»,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  refers	  not	  to	  ex-­‐
ternal	  reality	  but	  to	  its	  own	  sensuous	  elements	  («its	  forms	  and	  colours»,	  as	  Wittgenstein	  
puts	   it),	  as	   is	   indeed	  the	  case	  for	  a	  work	  of	  art.	   In	  this	  sense,	  the	   issue	  of	  the	   image	   is	  
strictly	  connected	  with	  the	  question	  of	  understanding,	  as	  this	  is	  presented	  in	  paragraph	  
531	  of	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  where	  Wittgenstein	  distinguishes	  logical	  under-­‐
standing	  from	  aesthetic	  understanding:	  
We	  speak	  of	  understanding	  a	  sentence	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  another	  
which	  says	  the	  same;	  but	  also	  in	  the	  sense	  in	  which	  it	  cannot	  be	  replaced	  by	  any	  other.	  (Any	  
more	  than	  one	  musical	  theme	  can	  be	  replaced	  by	  another.)	  In	  the	  one	  case,	  the	  thought	  in	  
the	  sentence	   is	  what	   is	  common	  to	  different	  sentences;	   in	  the	  other,	  something	  that	   is	  ex-­‐
pressed	  only	  by	  these	  words	  in	  these	  positions.	  (Understanding	  a	  poem).	  (PI:	  §	  531)	  
Now,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   a	   sentence	  whose	  meaning	   is	   rephrasable,	   the	   task	   of	   under-­‐
standing	  consists	   in	  «passing	  from	  unobvious	  nonsense	  to	  obvious	  nonsense»	  (cf.	  PI:	  §	  
464),	   that	   is	   it	  consists	   in	  going	  back	   from	  the	  conceptual	  determinateness	  of	   the	  sen-­‐
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tence	  to	  the	  family	  resemblances	  which	  form	  the	  condition	  of	  any	  conceptualisation	  and	  
classification,	  and	  thus	   to	   the	  unity	  which	   is	  nonsense	  as	  condition	  of	  any	  meaningful-­‐
ness.	  In	  the	  case,	  instead,	  of	  a	  non-­‐rephrasable	  sentence	  (cf.	  PI:	  §	  531)	  –	  i.e.	  a	  sentence	  
that	  does	  not	  have	  any	  conceptual	  determination	  but	  that,	  like	  the	  genre-­‐picture,	  «says	  
itself»	  –,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  those	  precise	  words	  in	  those	  precise	  positions,	  or	  
those	  precise	  «forms	  and	  colours»	  that	  we	  are	  in	  front	  of	  our	  eyes.	  
In	   this	   case,	   the	   case	   of	   the	  work	   of	   art,	  we	   have	   then	   a	   «transition	   from	  obvious	  
nonsense	   to	   something	   which	   is	   unobvious	   nonsense»	   (PI:	   §	   524);	   this	   means	   that	   a	  
work	  of	  art	  presents	  itself	  as	  something	  determinate	  which	  is	  not	  conceptual	  but	  mate-­‐
rial:	  those	  words,	  those	  forms	  and	  colours	  which,	  as	  such,	  lacking	  a	  determinate	  mean-­‐
ing,	  and	  being	  rather	  the	  result	  of	  an	  implosion	  of	  the	  invisible	  in	  the	  visible,	  do	  not	  lend	  
themselves	  to	  any	  determinate	  application	  or	  use.	  As	  a	  matter	  of	  fact,	  what	  we	  grasp	  in	  
a	  work	  of	  art	  is	  not	  one	  meaning	  or	  another,	  but	  one	  meaning	  and	  another,	  i.e.	  multiple	  
family	  resemblances	  and	  the	  unity	  implicit	  in	  them,	  which	  short-­‐circuit	  with	  the	  material	  
determinateness	  that	  is	  the	  form	  of	  the	  work.	  Thus,	  such	  determinateness	  does	  not	  ac-­‐
tually	   imply	  a	   family	  unity,	  but	   is	   that	  very	   family	  unity,	  since	   it	  puts	   it	  at	  work,	   that	   is	  
«presents»	   it,	   so	   that	  nonsense	  does	  not	  manifest	   itself	   at	  all	   in	  determinateness,	  but	  
conceals	  itself	  into	  it.	  Nevertheless,	  such	  presentation	  always	  offers	  itself	  through	  a	  de-­‐
terminate	   representation	   which,	   as	   such,	   constitutes	   one	   of	   the	  multiple	   senses	   pro-­‐
duced	  by	  the	  work,	  i.e.	  one	  of	  the	  multiple	  possibilities	  of	  making	  explicit	  the	  nonsense	  
that	   is	   implicit	   in	   it.	  Hence,	  then,	  the	  multiple	  meanings	  that	  at	  the	  same	  time	  present	  
and	  withdraw	  themselves,	  so	  much	  so	  that	  our	  understanding	  is	  always,	  together,	  a	  non-­‐
understanding	   (cf.	   PI:	   §	   524).	   In	   the	   case	   of	   a	   work	   of	   art	   then,	   since	   it	   offers	   itself	  
through	  its	  lines,	  words	  and	  colours,	  we	  face	  a	  nonsense	  –	  the	  family	  unity	  –	  which	  is	  in-­‐
separable	  from	  those	  signs,	  just	  as	  physical-­‐material	  signs.	  
So,	  the	  fact	  that	  those	  signs	  «say	  themselves»	  means,	  more	  precisely,	  that	  what	  they	  
«say»	   is	   exactly	   the	  multiplicity	   of	   family	   resemblances	   that,	   each	   time	   in	   a	   different	  
way,	  configure	  themselves	  as	  a	  unity.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	  such	  unity	  of	  the	  family	  
resemblances	   among	   the	  multiple	  meanings	  of	   those	  words,	   forms	  and	   colours,	   is,	   on	  
the	  one	  hand,	  the	  condition	  that	  makes	  those	  tangible	  signs	  representations	  and,	  on	  the	  
other	  hand,	  it	  is	  what	  those	  same	  signs	  represent.	  The	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  representation	  the	  
invisible	  offers	  itself	  in	  the	  visible,	  albeit	  remaining	  invisible,	  means	  that	  those	  signs	  are	  
representations	  precisely	  because	  in	  them	  there	  is	  that	  unity	  that	  remains	  nonetheless	  
the	  «other»	  of	  the	  signs	  themselves.	  The	  «other»	  is	  therefore	  such	  precisely	  because	  it	  
offers	  itself	  in	  the	  signs	  while	  remaining	  other	  from	  them,	  i.e.	  without	  becoming	  itself	  a	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sign.	  Thus,	  if	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  work	  of	  art	  signs	  surprise	  us,	  it	  is	  because	  they	  are	  ever	  new	  
and	   different	   representations	   of	   this	   «other»;	   the	   surprise,	   from	   this	   point	   of	   view,	  
springs	  from	  the	  logical	  unpredictability	  of	  representation,	  which	  clearly	  entails	  the	  inef-­‐
fectiveness	  of	  any	  attempt	  at	  a	  rational	  justification	  on	  our	  part.	  
7.	  Seeing	  and	  Seeing-­‐as;	  Image	  and	  Representation;	  Language	  and	  Thought	  
In	  this	  perspective,	  the	  short	  circuit	  of	  family	  unity	  and	  physical-­‐material	  signs	  requires	  
not	  a	   seeing	  but	  a	   real	  «seeing-­‐as»;	   it	   requires,	   in	  other	  words,	   that	   the	   image	  should	  
configure	   itself	   as	   a	   representation:	   this	   is	   just	   what	   happens,	   in	   an	   exemplary	   way,	  
when	  we	  are	  in	  front	  of	  a	  work	  of	  art.	  Regarding	  this	  issue,	  Wittgenstein	  recognises	  the	  
existence	   of	   a	   connection	   between	   image	   and	   representation.	   As	   a	  matter	   of	   fact,	   an	  
image,	   be	   it	   figurative	  or	  non-­‐figurative,	   presents	   itself	   in	   the	   first	   place	   as	   something	  
physical,	  which	  can	  acquire	  a	  determinate	  meaning	  only	  on	  condition	  of	  being	  seen	  in	  a	  
way	  or	  in	  another,	  that	  is	  of	  being	  represented	  in	  a	  certain	  manner	  and	  not	  otherwise.	  
This	  results	  from	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  a	  visual	  image	  there	  are	  non-­‐visual	  elements,	  with-­‐
out	  which	  that	  image	  wouldn’t	  even	  be	  perceived	  as	  such.	  This	  means	  that	  a	  visual	  im-­‐
age	  can	  be	  perceived	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  representations	  that	  are	  not	  exclusively	  visi-­‐
ble;	  but	  it	  also	  means	  that	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  image,	  i.e.	  its	  referring	  to	  something	  
determinate,	  exists	  only	  thanks	  to	  its	  opacity,	  or	  vagueness,	  which	  is	  such	  because	  it	   is	  
non-­‐visible	  and	  non-­‐sayable.	  
This	   is	   an	  originary	   condition,	  which	   is	   precisely	   the	  other	   of	   the	   image,	   that	  other	  
that	  offers	  itself	  in	  the	  image’s	  physical	  elements,	  while	  withdrawing	  from	  them,	  that	  is	  
remaining	  invisible.	  Thus,	   if	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  an	  image	  is	  readable	  only	  on	  condition	  of	  
configuring	  itself	  as	  a	  representation,	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  it	  can	  manifest	  itself,	  albeit	  re-­‐
maining	  «other»	  and	   invisible,	  only	   through	   that	   conditioned	  which	   is	   the	   image	   in	   its	  
materiality.	  There	  is	  then	  a	  connection	  between	  image	  and	  representation.	  And	  it	  is	  pre-­‐
cisely	   by	   seeing-­‐as,	   i.e.	   by	   creating	   representations,	   that	   we	   grasp,	   in	   the	   image,	   the	  
opacity	  of	   the	   image	   itself:	  an	  excess	  which	   is	   thinkable,	  but	  never	  completely	  sayable	  
and	  visible.	  If	  in	  the	  Notebooks	  Wittgenstein	  claims	  the	  identity	  of	  thought	  and	  language	  
–	  an	  identity	  guaranteed,	  evidently,	  by	  logic	  –,	  in	  the	  Philosophical	  Investigations,	  as	  well	  
as	  in	  subsequent	  works,	  the	  relation	  between	  thought	  and	  language	  becomes	  a	  relation	  
of	   identity-­‐difference.	  This	  means	  that	  thought,	  although	  presenting	   itself	   through	   lan-­‐
guage,	  always	  exceeds	  it.	  This	   is	  what	  Wittgenstein	  highlights	   in	  paragraph	  7	  of	  the	  se-­‐
cond	  volume	  of	  the	  Remarks	  on	  the	  Philosophy	  of	  Psychology:	  «It	  isn’t	  true	  that	  thinking	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is	  a	  kind	  of	  speaking,	  as	  I	  once	  said.	  The	  concept	  ‘thinking’	  is	  categorically	  different	  from	  
the	   concept	   “speaking”»	   (RPP:	   §	   7).	   However,	   thought,	   although	   exceeding	   language,	  
can	  never	  present	  itself	  independently	  of	  it,	  exactly	  as	  representation,	  although	  exceed-­‐
ing	  the	  image,	  can	  never	  be	  separated	  from	  the	  determinateness	  of	  the	  image	  itself.	  It	  is	  
then	  the	  determinateness	  of	  language	  and	  of	  the	  image	  that	  requires	  as	  its	  condition	  of	  
possibility	  the	  identity-­‐difference	  of	  thought	  and	  language,	  as	  well	  as	  of	  representation	  
and	  image.	  Hence	  the	  possibility	  of	  representing	  the	  invisible:	  this,	  indeed,	  manifests	  it-­‐
self	  in	  the	  representation	  only	  in	  connection	  with	  a	  visual	  image,	  from	  which	  it	  simulta-­‐
neously	  withdraws.	   If	   it	   is	   true	   that	   seeing-­‐as	   (and	  hence	   thinking)	   is	   the	  condition	   for	  
seeing	  –	  a	  condition	  that	  manifests	  itself	  in	  seeing	  –,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  it	  is	  only	  because	  
it	  withdraws	  from	  seeing	  that	  seeing	   is	  possible.	  We	  thus	  have	  a	  manifestation	  of	   that	  
invisible	  background	  which	  is	  the	  internal	  condition	  of	  the	  visible	  and	  which,	  as	  such,	  as	  
an	  aesthetic	  dimension,	  appeals	  to	  «feeling».	  
In	  this	  light,	  seeing-­‐as	  is	  a	  questioning	  of	  the	  givenness	  of	  the	  visible	  in	  order	  to	  make	  
the	  invisible	  emerge	  from	  it.	  But	  this	  also	  means	  that	  it	  is	  representation	  that	  enables	  us	  
to	  grasp	  the	  invisible	  with	  which	  the	  image	  is	  charged	  and	  thanks	  to	  which	  the	  image	  of-­‐
fers	  itself	  to	  us	  as	  a	  memory	  of	  the	  invisible.	  And	  since	  the	  invisible	  appears	  only	  in	  the	  
materiality	  of	  the	  image,	  that	  is	   in	  its	  forms	  and	  colours,	  then	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  aes-­‐
thetic	  principle	  is	  a	  sensuous	  and	  representative	  principle.	  Representation	  indeed,	  being	  
never	  totally	  reducible	  to	  the	  image,	  but	  giving	  itself	  always	  and	  only	  through	  the	  image,	  
shows	  how	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  only	  visible,	  but	  displays	  a	  connection	  of	  feeling	  and	  think-­‐
ing:	  thus,	  it	  is	  representation	  that	  makes	  visible,	  in	  the	  image,	  the	  invisible.	  	  
This	  is	  what	  we	  can	  term	  the	  «visual»,	  understood	  as	  the	  visible	  that	  opens	  itself	  up,	  
showing	  always	  and	  again	  something	  non-­‐visible,	  although	  this	  process	  of	  manifestation	  
never	  reaches	  an	  end.	  This	  is	  exactly	  what	  Adorno	  affirms	  when,	  in	  his	  Aesthetic	  Theory,	  
he	   defines	   artistic	   form,	   that	   is	   the	   sensuous	   elements	   of	   a	  work	   of	   art	   –	   and	   conse-­‐
quently	  of	   the	  visible	  –,	  as	  «sedimented	  content»:	   indeed,	   if	   form	  coincided	   fully	  with	  
content,	  then	  the	  latter	  could	  manifest	  itself	  once	  for	  all;	  on	  the	  contrary,	  just	  because	  it	  
is	  sedimented,	  that	  is	  because	  it	  is	  stratified	  in	  the	  tangible	  elements	  of	  form,	  i.e.	  of	  the	  
visible,	  such	  content	  is	  something	  that	  appears	  in	  constantly	  new	  and	  different	  manners,	  
without	  ever	  exhausting	  itself	  into	  something	  visible.	  For	  this	  very	  reason,	  then,	  the	  ar-­‐
tistic	  image	  for	  Adorno	  is	  not	  reproductive	  but	  productive,	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  it	  is	  mimesis	  
of	  itself,	  as	  it	  produces	  (i.e.	  makes	  visible)	  from	  within	  itself.	  This,	  in	  turn,	  is	  exactly	  what	  
also	  Paul	  Klee	  asserts	  in	  his	  Creative	  Confession:	  «Art	  does	  not	  reproduce	  the	  visible,	  but	  
makes	  visible»,	  referring	  to	  the	  ability	  of	  the	   image	  to	  manifest,	   from	  within	   itself,	   the	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non-­‐visible	   dimension	   which	   is	   the	   «genesis	   of	   the	   visible»,	   or	   its	   «prehistory»	   (the	  
realm	  of	  unrealised	  possibilities:	  again	   in	  Klee’s	  words,	  the	  world	  of	  the	  «dead»	  and	  of	  
the	   «unborn»).	   Thus,	   if	   such	   prehistory	   of	   the	   visible	   is	   a	   dimension	   that	   the	   artist,	  
thanks	  to	  his	  «penetrating	  gaze»,	  is	  able	  to	  grasp	  and	  translate	  into	  an	  image	  –	  concen-­‐
trating	  and	  concealing	  it	  in	  its	  «forms	  and	  colours»	  (cf.	  PI:	  §	  523)	  –,	  then	  the	  task	  of	  the	  
beholder	  is	  to	  go	  back,	  thanks	  to	  a	  gaze	  which	  Klee	  calls	  «grazing»,	  from	  the	  visibility	  of	  
the	  artistic	  image	  towards	  its	  implicit	  condition	  and,	  precisely,	  the	  non-­‐visible.	  Not	  only,	  
but	   this	   non-­‐visible	   dimension,	   which	   form	   makes	   appear	   in	   ever	   new	   and	   different	  
ways,	  is	  something	  historically	  determined	  that,	  as	  it	  were,	  is	  condensed	  in	  the	  form	  it-­‐
self:	   hence,	   in	   Adornian	   terms,	   the	   «truth	   content»	   of	   the	   image,	   that	   is	   its	   ability	   to	  
speak	  of	  the	  world,	  an	  ability	  that,	  paradoxically,	  is	  one	  with	  the	  self-­‐referential	  charac-­‐
ter	  of	  the	  work,	  i.e.	  its	  autonomy	  from	  the	  world.	  
On	  the	  whole,	  both	  according	  to	  Adorno	  and	  according	  to	  Wittgenstein,	  what	  the	  im-­‐
age	   displays	   is	   something	   hidden,	   that	   is	   something	   opaque,	   as	   compared	   to	   logic:	  
something	  which	  is	  «other»	  from	  the	  visible	  image	  and	  which,	  nevertheless,	  offers	  itself	  
only	   through	   the	   image	  and	   thanks	   to	   it.	  Hence,	   for	  both	  philosophers,	   the	   immanent	  
temporality	  of	  the	  image	  that	  had	  been	  previously	  underlined	  by	  Aby	  Warburg	  with	  his	  
strictly	  interconnected	  notions	  of	  Pathosformeln	  and	  Nachleben.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  
precisely	  the	  connection	  between	  visible	  and	  invisible,	  and	  thus	  between	  representation	  
and	   image,	   that	   transforms	   the	   image-­‐given,	   that	   is	   the	  determinate	   image	   in	   front	  of	  
our	  eyes,	  into	  an	  authentic	  «gift»,	  that	  is	  something	  unforeseen	  logically,	  and	  which	  –	  as	  
already	  mentioned	  –	  appears	  in	  ever	  new	  and	  different	  ways.	  
Hence,	   then,	   the	   idea	   of	   a	  memory	   that	   embodies	   itself	   in	   the	   image	   and	   that,	   by	  
showing	  the	  inherently	  temporal	  character	  of	  the	  image,	  together	  with	  its	  internal	  histo-­‐
ricity,	  makes	  a	  purely	  formal	  interpretation	  of	  it	  insufficient:	  what	  is	  at	  stake,	  indeed,	  is	  
the	  memory	  of	  something	  that	  cannot	  be	  entirely	  represented,	  of	  something	  that,	  while	  
offering	  itself	  to	  us	  in	  an	  exterior	  form,	  cannot	  be	  seen.	  So,	  it	  is	  precisely	  in	  the	  physical-­‐
material	  dimension	  –	   i.e.	   in	  what	  Adorno	  calls	  «form»	  –,	  and	  therefore	   in	  the	  realm	  of	  
the	  body,	   that	   the	   invisible	   is	   inscribed.	  From	  this	  point	  of	  view,	   if	   the	   image,	  being	   in	  
the	  first	  place	  made	  up	  of	  «lines	  and	  colours»,	   is	  able	  to	  surprise	  and	  astonish	  us,	   it	   is	  
because	   in	   its	  materiality	   is	  offered	  the	   interconnection	  of	  visible	  and	   invisible	  that,	  by	  
making	  the	  experience	  of	  vision	   interminable,	  constitutes	  the	  condition	   itself	  of	   its	   im-­‐
manent	  temporality.	  Understanding	  itself,	  moreover,	  cannot	  set	  this	  temporality	  aside;	  
it	   is	  no	   coincidence	   then	   that	   the	   ideal	  of	   absolute	   formal	   transparency	   characterising	  
the	   logical	   image	  of	   the	  Tractatus	   expresses	   in	   the	   first	  place	  a	   refusal	  of	   temporality.	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The	  fact	  that	  representation	  is	  necessarily,	  and	  precariously,	  balanced	  between	  opacity	  
and	  transparency	  means,	  therefore,	  that	  it	  encompasses	  both	  temporality	  and	  form,	  ab-­‐
sence	   and	  presence:	   beyond	   the	   image,	   it	   is	   indeed	  opacity	   that	   presents	   itself	   in	   the	  
image	  right	  as	  it	  withdraws	  from	  it.	  Consequently,	  denying	  this	  dimension	  of	  opacity	  in	  
the	  image	  –	  i.e.	  denying	  the	  invisible	  –,	  as	  if	  the	  image	  were	  totally	  transparent	  (as	  if	  it	  
could	   resolve	   itself	   entirely	   into	   something	   visible),	   would	  make	   the	   image	   an	   empty	  
simulacrum,	  unable	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  world.	  
It	   is	  doubtless	   that,	   in	  Wittgenstein,	   the	  question	  of	   representation	   is	  one	  with	   the	  
question	  of	  thought:	  representing	  is	  indeed	  thinking.	  It	  is	  an	  incessantly	  renewed	  effort	  
of	  «restarting	  the	  beginning»,	  of	  going	  back	  to	  what	  is	  before;	  not,	  however,	  in	  the	  sense	  
of	  trying	  to	  reach	  the	  first	  foundation	  of	  reality,	  since	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  origin	  is	  actual-­‐
ly	  an	  illusory	  one:	  the	  opacity,	  the	  occult	  nonsense,	  is	  this	  before	  that	  always	  offers	  itself	  
in	  the	  here	  and	  now	  of	  the	  material	  image.	  Conceived	  in	  this	  manner,	  opacity	  embodies	  
the	  originary	  character	  of	  representation	  as	  opposed	  to	  the	  image:	  the	  originary	  charac-­‐
ter,	  then,	  of	  thought	  as	  opposed	  to	  language.	  As	  a	  result,	  if	  the	  image	  is	  always	  born	  of	  
the	   endeavour	   to	   «say»	   such	   opacity,	   of	   making	   visible	   the	   invisible,	   what	   ultimately	  
emerges	   is	  a	  demonstration	  of	   impotence:	  opacity,	   in	   this	   sense,	   is	  a	  necessity	   for	   the	  
image	  and,	  at	   the	   same	   time,	   its	   defeat.	   In	   this	  way,	   the	  «before»	   is	   not	   reached	  and	  
thus	  «eliminated»,	  but	  reproduces	   itself	  always	  and	  again.	  This	   is	  exactly,	   in	  short,	   the	  
memory	  connected	  with	  representation:	   the	  renewed	  production	  of	   the	  origin,	  not	  the	  
preservation	  of	  something	  given	  once	  for	  all	  in	  the	  past.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  it	  is	  just	  and	  
only	   in	   the	   tangible	  dimension	  of	   the	   image	   that	   its	  opacity	   shows	   itself,	  but	   this	  «in»	  
should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	   referring	   to	   the	  place	  where	   the	  essence	   finally	  offers	   it-­‐
self,	  as	  if	  the	  surface	  of	  sensible	  phenomena	  were	  a	  mere	  occasion	  for	  the	  unveiling	  of	  
an	  intelligible	  depth;	  this	  «in»	  should	  instead	  be	  understood	  as	  referring	  to	  the	  place	  of	  
manifestation	  of	  that	  «before»	  that	  has	  become	  absent,	  since	  it	  is	  thanks	  to	  this	  absence	  
that	   the	   surface	  offers	   itself	   to	  us	  as	   the	  place	  of	  an	  ever	   renewed	  wonder.	  From	  this	  
point	  of	  view,	  Wittgenstein’s	  entire	  reflection	  is	  an	  incessant	  questioning	  of	  the	  datum,	  
which	  is	  also	  an	  incessant	  questioning	  of	  seeing:	  just	  as	  seeing	  exists	  on	  the	  condition	  of	  
seeing-­‐as,	   in	   the	   same	  way	   transparency	   exists	   on	   the	   condition	   of	   opacity.	   However,	  
the	   fact	   remains	   that,	   if	   it	   is	   possible	   to	   speak	  of	   opacity,	   such	  possibility	   implies	   that	  
opacity	  is	  already	  lacerated	  in	  itself,	  «re-­‐vealing	  itself»	  as	  the	  other	  of	  the	  vision.	  Thus,	  if	  
it	  is	  true	  not	  that	  «I	  know	  because	  I	  see»	  but,	  rather,	  that	  «I	  see	  because	  I	  know»	  –	  an	  
awareness	   already	   expressed	   by	   Nietzsche	   –,	   where	   «seeing»	   is	   equivalent	   to	   under-­‐
standing	  and	  «knowing»	  is	  equivalent	  to	  feeling,	  it	  is	  also	  true	  that	  such	  knowing,	  as	  aes-­‐
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thetic	   condition	   of	   any	   possible	   understanding	   and	   representation,	   can	  manifest	   itself	  
precisely	  and	  exclusively	  in	  seeing.	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